Wednesday, March 4, 2015

Culture Clash, concluding thoughts: Can Science Save Us? Can We Save Science?

Conclusion of conversation between Dr. John Robinson and Dr. Kai Chan, who both weigh in with their final reflections below. 

This is the final part of the series.  If you missed it: part 1part 2part 3part 4, part 5.


KC: How did two amicable colleagues resort to raised voices discussing sustainability and the imaginary? In part 1 of this exchange between Sustainability thinker John Robinson and myself (Kai Chan), John introduced a fascinating new research project/exhibit on sustainability as an imaginary problem, and I responded with concerns that science was not parallel to religion. In parts twothreefour, and five we debated the extent to which science is religious, ideological, or morally prescriptive, and decided finally that what John was calling 'science' was actually better termed 'materialist metaphysics'. At that point, I think we both felt a happy near-complete resolution. Little did we realize what tension lay ahead....

KC: Walking briskly out of a faculty meeting where we met with President Arvind Gupta as a department, John and I commented on the weekend's extended email exchange. Just like what students seem to imagine of university professors, John joked, spending weekends writing long philosophical emails to one another. I laughed and noted just how rare it is for me to email about work at all on the weekend.

As we reached the base of the stairs in the beautiful new Earth Sciences Building, in the heart of the wide-open lobby (five floors of open space above), we stumbled upon one remaining point of difference. If I remember correctly, John noted that he was glad that the substitution of 'materialist metaphysics' for 'science' allowed me to see that this philosophical perspective on which science is founded is indeed prescriptive.

Taken aback, I blurted out, surely too adamantly, "Well, I don't agree with that."

"What do you mean?? Of course it's prescriptive!!" John exclaimed, surely exhausted by the five rounds of emails and the notion that they did not--after all--come to resolution.

And that was the beginning of a tense few minutes. While we reconciled what we meant by 'prescriptive', I also weighed in on my concerns about how the planned Sustainability in an Imaginary World exhibit might send dangerous signals about the nature of science--even if the choice presented to participants was between 'Religion', 'Literature', and 'Materialist Metaphysics' (but noted as the foundation for science). (Note: partly as a result of our exchange, the names of two of the three perspectives have been changed, as discussed in John’s concluding remarks below). After agreeing that by one interpretation, the latter is certainly prescriptive (more on this below), I expressed my worry that other folks would interpret the choice as I did (clearly making logical leaps based on my sample size of one), and John pointed out appropriately that I'm not the first person they had explained the planned exhibit to, but the only one to have such a reaction (I interpreted John's body language as seeing my reaction to be clearly mistaken). At that point, it seemed clear that John no longer believed me that I was not deeply immersed in the materialist metaphysics perspective; I was just trying to play devil's advocate.

And that's when steam rose from my collar, and our voices escalated as we gesticulated, to the point that I glanced up and wondered whether President Gupta and Dean of Science Simon Peacock were watching this animated display of academic zeal. A friend on sabbatical, David Earn, punctured the tension. With hugely self-conscious awkwardness, I said hi and apologized that I really could not leave this conversation at that juncture.

Looking back on this moment, it's all so laughable. And fortunately, John and I both realized that and reflected on which implicit assumptions brought us to that bizarrely escalated moment. 

As a practicing scientist, I certainly see the great value in the scientific perspective, which I see as accepting the materialist metaphysics position temporarily for the sake of applying the scientific method to better understand cause and effect. I agree that we cannot know 'truth', but that doesn't trouble me much. Science helps us get closer to making sense of how much of the world appears to operate, and that's good enough for me 99.9% of the time.

As someone who studied and publishes in philosophy, I was shocked to find myself so strongly at odds on these issues with a humanities scholar. But my primary philosophy education was logic and ethics, much more than epistemology and metaphysics. So for me, 'prescriptive' meant a complete and logical moral argument about what one should do.

John's training is obviously much broader across the humanities, and from his perspective, worldviews are prescriptive in the sense that they colour what we view as right. Of course they do! I argued that the scientific method (including peer review) is an imperfect but intentional and somewhat effective tool for critiquing such implicit assumptions, and for rebuking inappropriately value-laden conclusions. John held the position that the scientific community openly embraced deeply consequential value-laden assumptions.

Thinking then about John's own background, I realized that since we were using 'science' inclusively (both natural and social), when John said 'science' he also imagined economics. (I remembered that John has often critiqued the implicit assumptions in economics, and John was Tom Green's supervisor for an excellent PhD dissertation on the limitations of undergraduate teaching in economics.) Much more than chemistry, physics, and biology, I certainly agree that economics makes broad and substantial assumptions about value, which are clearly prescriptive in the sense John intends. Think of the distorting power of GDP measures and economic growth in discussions about the health of a nation. Everyone can agree to beat up on economics, can't we? ;)

Twice (with 'prescriptive' and 'science'), we used the same words in substantially different ways without knowing it. Ah, the challenges of interdisciplinarity!

Reflecting on the Sustainability in an Imaginary World Project, my concern lingers that it may inadvertently result in further confusion about the role and utility of science. In this time when science is so badly being distorted, maligned, and ignored in official circles in both Canada and the USA, I dread anything that lends credence to the arguments of those anti-science interests. Perhaps irrationally, I fear climate skeptics using this exhibit--which seeks to make sustainability more imaginary (with less emphasis on fact)--to justify ignoring climate science, choosing instead to 'imagine' what human actions will incur for our climate.

That said, the planned exhibit also makes superb points, so I'm looking forward to experiencing it!


And now, from Dr. Robinson

JR: I felt exactly the same as Kai: an apparent happy resolution to our disagreements in our email exchanges seemed to dissolve into thin air and here we were at loggerheads again. As he so well describes, we discovered, yet again, that different implicit assumptions each of us had about both our own position and that of each other, were in play. I think our experience in this exchange reinforces the argument that deep forms of interdisciplinarity require actual immersion in each other’s world: there is no substitute for lots of time spent together in discussion.

Directly as a result of our exchange, I have decided that we need to change the name of the three perspectives/worlds we are exploring in the Sustainability in an Imaginary World project. They are derived from Richard Rorty’s brilliant article “Philosophy as a Transitional Genre” (in Philosophy as Cultural Politics, Philosophical Papers, Vol 4, Cambridge University Press, 2007), where he says that “that the intellectuals of the West have, since the Renaissance, progressed through three stages: they have hoped for redemption first from God, then from philosophy, and now from literature.” He goes on to say that the last gasp of the philosophical stage is a belief in materialist metaphysics. Rorty describes it this way: “This was the attempt to put natural science in the place of both religion and Socratic reflection, to see empirical inquiry as providing exactly what Socrates thought it could never give us—redemptive truth.”

In my exchanges with Kai, I used the shorthand of “religious, scientific and literary perspectives/worlds” to describe the three positions. Based on our discussion, I think it would be better to say “spiritual, materialist, and literary perspectives/worlds”. That allows a separation in principle between science and materialism. Many scientists are of course deeply religious, though I would guess that materialist metaphysics is by far the most prevalent philosophical position of most practicing scientists. This change of language also allows us to include, in the spiritual category, those that see redemptive truth in the non-material realm, but perhaps don’t belong to any organized religion.

I think this issue underlies the question of the role and status of scientific understanding. Kai says “Science helps us get closer to making sense of how much of the world appears to operate”, and I agree with that. But, from a literary perspective point of view, much turns on what we mean when we use terms like “world” (not to mention “making sense” and “appears”). Does this world exist independent of our beliefs, values and understandings? Both the spiritual and materialist perspectives/world would say that it does. We may have only partial understanding of that world (we see through a glass darkly in one famous religious statement) but it exists independently of us. The literary perspective/world challenges this view. In Rorty’s language “we only have each other”. There is no external reality or divine plan that exists outside us.

I hope this helps to explain why I have used the awkward term “perceptive/world” in this brief comment. In both the spiritual and materialist worlds, these questions are matters of perspective or world-view: a view we have of the world, which exists independently of those views. But in the literary world, it is not a question of a perspective but of the nature of the world itself. Put in somewhat literary terms, the world is fictional all the way down.

The purpose of the Sustainability in an Imaginary World project is to explore the question of whether the difference among these three perspectives is important for addressing sustainability concerns. In particular, what would it mean for sustainability to adopt a literary view (the other two are much better understood, and practiced, I think). What worlds do these three approaches give rise to?

From this point of view, it is not just economics that is prescriptive (though I certainly agree with Kai that economics is prescriptive in particular ways that physical and natural science are not). But science itself, as a way of thinking, almost always posits the existence of an external world that exists, and operates, independently of human existence. (Indeed, explicitly championing that point is a central argument of much of environmental science. We have to escape from anthropocentrism, it is claimed, and recognize the existence, and value, of a world independent of us if we are to save or preserve nature.) It is in this ontological sense that the materialist perspective/world is prescriptive, and such ontological prescriptions have very large practical consequences. I think Kai and I agree on this. [KC: Indeed, we do!]

As Kai says, he comes at these questions from the point of view of logic and ethics, while I am more focussed on epistemological and metaphysical questions. As a result I have a lot of trouble with the fact-value distinction, and therefore with the view that prescription applies only to a moral realm.

As to Kai’s final point about the Sustainability in an Imaginary World project potentially undermining public perceptions of science, I prefer to think that it instead offers at least the possibility of suggesting a different kind of science than is usually provided. As Rorty is at pains to argue, the literary approach does not deny that science is the best social process we currently have for predicting phenomena (as opposed for example to saying objectively true things about some reality that exists external to us). But science is itself of course a human endeavor (as a century or so of science studies has exhaustively shown). The challenge here is to articulate what a literary approach to science would mean. My suspicion is that it would be both very different from, and perhaps more useful for sustainability, (and maybe even less “distorted, maligned, and ignored”, despite having “less emphasis on fact”) than the kind of science that is usually on offer. But even to raise this question means trying to articulate what this different approach might look like, and how it compares to more conventional approaches. That is a major purpose of the Sustainability in an Imaginary World project.

Monday, March 2, 2015

Culture Clash part 5: Who is the scientist, and who the humanist?

An ongoing conversation between Dr. John Robinson and Dr. Kai Chan

This is part 5.  If you missed it: part 1part 2part 3, part 4 ... Part 6 (conclusion).

KC: How did two amicable colleagues resort to raised voices discussing sustainability and the imaginary? In part 1 of this exchange between Sustainability thinker John Robinson and myself (Kai Chan), John introduced a fascinating new exhibit on sustainability as an imaginary problem, and I responded with concerns that science was not parallel to religion. In parts two, three, and four, we debated the extent to which science is religious, ideological, or morally prescriptive, and whether people adopt a 'science' or 'religion' worldview whole-hog. At this point, I was beginning to wonder why I felt obliged to defend science so fiercely from a man named 2012 Canadian environmental scientist of the year....

From: <Robinson>, John
Date: Monday, January 12, 2015 at 9:18 AM
To: Kai Chan
Cc: "RobinsonJohn"
Subject: RE: papers; and sustainability, science, and the imaginary

Kai,

I had two thoughts on reading your email, which I hope will narrow the differences between us.

I hope that the first point may in fact give you some comfort about what we are trying to do in SIW [Sustainability in an Imaginary World]. The three perspectives (what we call “axiom sets” in the project) are intended to represent ideal types. As I said rather clumsily in a past email, we do not claim that they represent the actual views of any set of people, or any particular individuals. But I do think they represent perspectives that are more or less internally consistent, and which have had major historical significance. Our email discussion has made me think that we need to re-think our naming of them. With regard to the “scientific” axiom set, for example, it may be more useful to label it “materialist metaphysics”, as Rorty does. This would make it clear that it is an identifiable position/perspective, but not the perspective necessarily held by all scientists. For similar reasons, we may want to re-label the “religious” axiom set. (I think there is less worry about the “literary” one since this is not a label used by a particular group of people.)

So our claim is not about what “science” is or represents (in my own view, science is just what scientists do), but what this axiom set implies about the world, and its implications for our approach to sustainability. Similarly for the other two axiom sets.

At the individual level, of course there can be great diversity of views. I believe the axiom sets represent internally coherent views about the way the world is, but no one is required to subscribe to them holus bolus. I suspect most of us hold mixtures of these positions, without too much concern for internal logical consistency. This is the point I was trying to convey  with my earlier comments about cognitive dissonance. I think if you pushed this mixture of views in any specific case, you would find some significant inconsistencies, and even contradictions. But we are not required to be logically consistent in our deepest beliefs. Indeed, some would argue against that as a goal.

My second point has to do with your own position in our discussions. If you do not subscribe to the premises I outlined in my last email and instead agree “almost completely” with what I wrote in the email before that, then welcome to the literary perspective!

All the best,
John
                                         
John Robinson 
Associate Provost, Sustainability | UBC Sustainability Initiative
Professor | Institute of Resources, Environment and Sustainability
Professor | Department of Geography
The University of British Columbia
2260 West Mall Vancouver, BC Canada V6T 1Z4
Phone 604 822 9188 | Fax:  1.604.822.9250                                   
www.sustain.ubc.ca – UBC Sustainability Initiative (USI)
www.ires.ubc.ca – Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability (IRES)
www.cirs.ubc.ca – Centre for Interactive research on Sustainability (CIRS)



From: 
<Chan>, Kai Chan <kaichan@ires.ubc.ca>
Date: Monday, January 12, 2015 at 9:57 AM
To: "RobinsonJohn" <john.robinson@ubc.ca>
Subject: Re: papers; and sustainability, science, and the imaginary

Hi John, thanks for this. Yes, the differences have narrowed greatly.

I now understand much better what you’re trying to do in SIW, and my concerns are significantly mitigated by using ‘materialist metaphysics’ in place of ‘science’. And I agree completely that many of us have multiple internal inconsistencies. My main question remains, though: if many people naturally adopt multiple of the three perspectives simultaneously, is it sufficiently relevant and needed to force a false choice between them?

And, yes, it seems that I am dwelling in the literary! I’m not surprised: I was a writer (by identity, not profession; of fiction, fantasy, and science fiction) long before I was a scientist.

Best,
Kai

KC: At this point, I figured that we had come to a happy resolution. Little did I realize, the moment of greatest tension lay just ahead....

Friday, February 27, 2015

Culture Clash part 4: Are Worldviews like Hats (Switchable)? Is Science Morally Prescriptive?

A continuing conversation between Dr. John Robinson and Dr. Kai Chan

This is part 4.  If you missed it: part 1, part 2, part 3 ... part 5, part 6 (conclusion).

KC: How did two amicable colleagues get red in the face discussing sustainability and the imaginary? In part 1 of this exchange between Sustainability thinker John Robinson and myself (Kai Chan), John introduced a fascinating new exhibit on sustainability as an imaginary problem, and I responded with concerns that science was not parallel to religion. In parts two and three, we debated that point using the Dark Ages as an example, and I raised the point that people don't adopt a 'science' or 'religion' worldview whole-hog, but rather piecemeal.... Surely we can reach agreement now!?

From: <Robinson>, John
Date: Sunday, January 11, 2015 at 5:00 PM
To: Kai Chan
Cc: "RobinsonJohn"
Subject: RE: papers; and sustainability, science, and the imaginary

Kai,

I suspect that we will not agree on this, but let me have another try.

The values that are inextricably embedded in a scientific perspective, it seems to me, lie at a very deep epistemological level. They include positions such as the view that there exists an external world, independent of any views or ideas we may have of it, or that the stars are not alive or possessed of consciousness or intentionality, or that values are something that humans provide to the world. Of course there are lower level values that are in dispute or vary from individual to individual, but that is not the level I am interested in. I think it is well established that in many ways we do not pick our perspectives at these deep levels but they pick us. Put another way, we grow into a set of deep beliefs or understandings through some combination of experience, education and perhaps temperament.

So, at this deep level, it is not a matter of picking and choosing, or blithely combining. The religious view that the modern world is essentially dark because of its spiritual emptiness is not something that is equivalent to, or at the same level as, the recognition that medieval times had great poverty or high levels of starvation. These are qualitatively different judgements, and one is vastly (I used the word “cosmically” in my previous email) more important than the other. The great fear of a religiously minded person of the middle ages was that the world would come to an end spiritually, not physically; that the anti-Christ would come. I think it is plausible to believe that our modern world does in many ways represent those end-times. Indeed, I believe there are many who believe precisely this. This is indeed a major difference. One cannot combine this sensibility with a scientific one.

Note that, just like I am not speaking of specific (or all) scientists, when I talk about the scientific framework, I am not speaking of specific (or all) religious believers, when I talk about the religious framework. There are of course many scientists who are people of faith, and religious believers who are supporters of science. Rather, the claim I am making is that it is possible to postulate three incommensurable frameworks, which ultimately constitute the world at a deep level, and which may have very different implications for how we think about sustainability. If a person is utterly consistent in his or her beliefs, she or he will adhere to one of these positions. But in practice, most of us exhibit a high degree of cognitive dissonance, and can hold multiple inconsistent and even contradictory viewpoints. My argument does not depend on there being large number of people who hold precisely to these frameworks, simply that they exist, and as framework re incommensurable.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
I think you are in a bit of trouble with your partial moral argument thesis, since it is hard to see why a complete moral argument (whatever that is) is required for science to be prescriptive. It seems to me that there is a lot of strongly prescriptive advocacy around that does not come close to having a complete moral argument. But in the end my view on this issue is not important here, because I think we are , again, arguing at different levels. Sure there is a lot of diversity and incompleteness in any given set of circumstances. Indeed, as suggested in the previous paragraph, I would argue there always is. But, again, at the level of underlying epistemological premises of the kind in described above, I think these frameworks are homogenous, even monolithic.

So the issue is not so much that science has been used for political ends. We agree that it has, and I think we agree that this is a misuse of science. But this does not detract from the circumstance that both science and  politics, in the modern secular world, are based on a set of deep-lying epistemological and ontological premises that they share. Science does indeed strive to limit the effects of individual values, such as material self-interest, or ideological positions. It is the most successful social enterprise we have in that regard. But it does indeed prescriptively impose a normative framework about, for example, what constitutes understanding, about the meaning and value of “objectivity”, and about the material nature of external reality.

As to speaking to a broader audience, I would be happy to discuss it. In the meantime, do you mind if I circulate this correspondence to the Imaginary World team and some of my grad students?

All the best,
John
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
John Robinson 
Associate Provost, Sustainability | UBC Sustainability Initiative
Professor | Institute of Resources, Environment and Sustainability
Professor | Department of Geography
The University of British Columbia
2260 West Mall Vancouver, BC Canada V6T 1Z4
www.sustain.ubc.ca – UBC Sustainability Initiative (USI)
www.ires.ubc.ca – Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability (IRES)
www.cirs.ubc.ca – Centre for Interactive research on Sustainability (CIRS)



From: Chan, Kai
Sent: Sunday, January 11, 2015 5:35 PM
To: RobinsonJohn
Subject: Re: papers; and sustainability, science, and the imaginary

Hi John,

We agree that we still don’t fully agree! ;) Again, there are several points of agreement (e.g., that fundamentalist religious folks might feel as you suggest), but there are important remaining points of difference.

I can see that by one argument, it doesn’t matter that very few people adhere to only one of lenses/worlds. But I would argue that this represents a potential source of critical confusion in the exhibit.

I also don’t agree that science requires any of the value premises that you state below. E.g., it does not require that there is an external reality, only that we can probe our surroundings in such a way that there appears to be one. Similarly, it does not state what constitutes understanding, but rather a method for deriving one kind of understanding (a scientific understanding). Nowhere does ‘science’ state that this is the only kind of understanding.

Accordingly, I don’t agree that there are necessarily inconsistencies between science and religion. It all depends on how one interprets each of those. There might be inconsistencies between how you are articulating ‘science’ and ‘religion’, but if most people have understood these concepts in terms that mitigate or eliminate those inconsistencies, then you’re highly likely to talk past your audience (just as we have been talking past each other). The more folks that interpret ‘science’ and ‘religion’ differently than you intend, the fewer folks who will get from your exhibit what you intend. I think that the majority have starkly different views; perhaps you’d only be preaching to the choir and confusing the masses.

Furthermore, epistemological and moral premises are different. An epistemological premise does not provide the prescription needed for a moral argument.

Lastly, the point isn’t whether the complete moral argument is articulated. Sure, activists make moral prescriptions without stating their premises, etc. The point is that science does not contain moral premises, and so science cannot be prescriptive. That is, any moral premises that a scientist might have, or someone arguing ‘on a scientific basis’ might have, are not a sanctioned component of science. Thus, it is not science that is doing the prescribing.

I’d be happy for you to circulate this correspondence, John. Thanks so much for persisting—it’s been interesting!

Best,
Kai

Wednesday, February 25, 2015

Interdisciplinary Culture Clash, part 3: If Not a Religion, Is Science an Ideology?

An ongoing conversation between Dr. John Robinson and Dr. Kai Chan

This is Part 3.  If you missed it:  Part 1, Part 2 ... Part 4. Part 5. Part 6 (conclusion).

KC: How did two amicable colleagues get red in the face discussing sustainability and the imaginary? In part 1 of this exchange between Sustainability thinker John Robinson and myself (Kai Chan), John introduced a fascinating new exhibit on sustainability as an imaginary problem, and I responded with concerns that science was not parallel to religion. In part two, we debated that point using the Dark Ages as an example. Here we start really talking past each other, even more than we initially realized (you may read a little exasperation between the lines)....

From: <Robinson>, John
Date: Saturday, January 10, 2015 at 8:04 PM
To: Kai Chan
Cc: "RobinsonJohn"
Subject: RE: papers; and sustainability, science, and the imaginary

Kai,

I think we are still talking past each other, which is perhaps to be expected since we are just beginning a discussion of very complex questions.

On the Dark Ages issue, your claim about the difference in material circumstances is quite correct, but simply serves to further illustrate my point, I think. The reason that medieval devout Christians might call our age “dark” relative to theirs has nothing to do with “the prevalence of disease, starvation, war, etc.” They would presumably care about those things, but also believe that such issues are far less important, indeed cosmically less important, than religious questions. And, from the point of view of unquestioning belief in a single, Catholic and apostolic Church, deeply integrated with all forms of governments and social life,  the idea of a mostly secular age like ours, not to mention the separation of Church and state, would presumably strike them as roughly equivalent to the reign of the anti-Christ. In other words, from the point of view of a deeply religious perspective (“religious” in this case meaning medieval Christianity), theological, spiritual  and religious issues are much more important than merely material ones. Of course, from the point of view of a modern secular culture, the opposite is the case. So the modern secularist can truly call the Dark Ages dark, in terms of the criteria that matter to him or her. But a medieval Christian could just as well call our time Dark Ages, with just as much justification, using a different set of criteria. That is of course the point, that the very criteria to be used to evaluate such a question are fundamentally different. (By the way, ignoring issues such as this in dealing with fundamentalist Islamicist movements in the world today is, I believe, a recipe for disaster.)

Turning to the question of the role of science in society, note that my claim isn’t about what scientists think but more generally what people in a modern secular culture, including scientists, think. In our case, that culture is deeply impregnated with a view of science as the fundamental epistemological arbiter. We thereby equate scientific understanding with our best approach to the truth about the nature of a reality which is independent of us. Those views, that there is a reality independent of us, and that science provides us with the best understanding of that reality, are characteristic of our culture. They were not the views of pre-modern Western world, not of most of the rest of the world for most of history. Yet they are so deeply embedded in our culture that most of us never even consider that they are historically contingent in this way. They are simply seen as descriptive viewpoints, not contested claims.

It is in this sense that I would disagree with you when you say that science is not a world-view (though in another way, which I think you will disagree with, I agree with that statement; see below.) The view that science is descriptive, not prescriptive, is, I believe, a contestable viewpoint. The distinction between facts and values, which underlies your claim that science is not about determining objectives but about interpreting process, has been strongly challenged (and of course also defended) in the history and philosophy of science, for many  decades. The huge debates sparked by the work of Thomas Kuhn were largely about this question. My reading of that work, and the half century or so of science studies (sociology of scientific knowledge, STS [science, technology and society], social studies of science, etc.), is that there is a very compelling critique of the view that science is essentially descriptive, that facts can be separated from values, and that observation can be theory independent. I myself subscribe to the view that observation is unavoidably deeply theory-laden, so facts and values are inextricably entangled at a deep level, and that science is, as Habermas argued, a “knowledge-constitutive interest”. I completely agree that if we want to describe “process” in terms of prediction, and potential control of physical behaviour, then science represents the most socially reliable process we know today for doing so (perhaps largely because of its essentially social processes of verification: peer review and replication). Yet such prediction is not a value-neutral goal at all, but reflects a set of deep assumptions about the way the world works and what we mean by understanding. In that sense, science, as a social enterprise is indeed rooted in a particular set of values and meanings. It is indeed literally a meaning-making process, not simply a neutral description of the world.

I accept that this value-ladeness and prescriptiveness exists at different levels, and I would agree that the way science is used by, say, the regenerative design scholars may represent a more egregious approach to being prescriptive than you or other scientists may agree with. But my experience with climate change issues, and lots of other sustainability questions, is that such an approach, which says that science tells us how to act, is very common. And in a curious kind of way, it is more (though unconsciously) consistent with the description of science that I am arguing for, than is your claim that science is purely descriptive. In other words, the view that ecological science, for example, is the “operating manual for planet earth” (to pick a famous claim) is common to more than regenerative design scholars, and at least acknowledges that science is indeed value-laden.

So while I myself don’t believe that modern science provides “redemptive truth”, to use Rorty’s phrase (i.e. knowledge that tells us how to live), I do believe that such a claim is inherent in the very fabric of modern science, and the claim that it is just value-free description is not defensible. I take you to be also arguing against science as redemptive, but for the opposite reason: you believe that science is, in principle (if not always in practice) value-free and morally neutral.

In other words, I think you are arguing that science is not redemptive because it is, or should be, value free and morally neutral. I agree that we should not look to science for redemptive truth, but, since it is unavoidably value laden, this cannot be by simply purifying our practice so that we exclude discussion of values from the scientific enterprise. Those values are too deeply embedded to be removable; they are inherent in the very practice of science. My approach is, rather, accepting what is sometimes called a post-modernist or social constructivist point of view, to challenge the intellectual monopoly of science as epistemological arbiter of our world. That is, let’s celebrate it for what it does well (predict phenomena), but recognize that that is just one set of values and descriptions. Science doesn’t tell us anything at all about objective reality, independent of humanity, since the idea that there is such a thing as objective reality is itself just one of the products of a scientific world-view.

It is in this sense that what Rorty calls the literary perspective exists as an alternative viewpoint. This viewpoint suggests that there is no reality independent of our various constructions of it. We only have each other, to use Rorty’s language. In this sense the literary perspective in indeed an alternative to both the religious and scientific perspectives, which of course are very different from each other, but share the belief that there exists an absolute truth, independent of us.

And from the point of view of the literary perspective, these three perspectives (religious, scientific and literary) are not simply world-views, but actually constitutive of the world itself (as suggested above, I suspect you would not be happy with this version of the argument that science is not a world-view). That is, the literary perspective claims that each of the three perspectives implies a completely different concept of the nature of the world and how we exist within it.  Of course from the point of view of either of the other two perspectives, this claim is false, since there is, from either of the other two viewpoints, a real world independent of our consciousness. This leads to an unavoidable meta-problem in that each description of the three perspectives is itself perspective-dependent: there can be no neutral way of describing them that is acceptable to all three.

It is this line of argument that gives rise to our choice of these three perspectives as the basis for the world-making process in the Sustainability in an Imaginary World project. In my view, lying behind the specific policy, behavioural and technological choices we need to make (important as they are) are more fundamental choices about which world we live in. This is a matter of decision, not description. The purpose of the SIW [Sustainability in an Imaginary World] project is to try and illustrate the link between such decisions and sustainability.

If you have waded through this email to this point, you may feel that my position leads to an unacceptable from of social constructivism and relativism, where anything goes, there is no real world, and there is no basis for deciding what views are legitimate in any circumstances. Astrology and astrophysics are simply collected sets of opinion, with no basis to choose between them. I would argue that, on the contrary, there are always very compelling reasons to choose among such frameworks, just that these reasons are essentially social, not matters of objective truth. But, even if we accept such a position, it seems to call into question the very idea of an external world, which in turn seems to be a rather odd position for someone in the sustainability field to adopt.  So let me end by saying that I think Latour has much to offer us here. If I am right in interpreting his arguments (always a question with respect to his work), he is calling for an approach that dissolves the artificial distinction between facts and values, and gives the material world real agency. So, the literary approach may be consistent with a view that is not just about the social construction of reality, but about an active collaboration between us and our world in a kind of mutual constitution of reality. That reality is not fixed in time or place; much less is it absolute or objectively true. But it is the most fruitful approach and position to take at our time and place in history, given all our current cultural resources and behaviours, including, of course, modern science itself. This is why I adopt what I call a procedural approach to sustainability, which sees sustainability as an essentially contested concept, and therefore local in time and place in the sense that it must be worked out for each time and place. Sustainability does not mean the same for us as it will for others in the future, any more than democracy or justice means the same for us in Canada today as they meant for the French in the 18th century, or the Romans in the 4th century. Sustainability is this an inherently local, ethical and normative concept.

Sorry for the long email. You inspired me to a lengthier response that I intended.

All the best,
John
                                                                               
John Robinson 
Associate Provost, Sustainability | UBC Sustainability Initiative
Professor | Institute of Resources, Environment and Sustainability
Professor | Department of Geography
The University of British Columbia
2260 West Mall Vancouver, BC Canada V6T 1Z4
www.sustain.ubc.ca – UBC Sustainability Initiative (USI)
www.ires.ubc.ca – Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability (IRES)
www.cirs.ubc.ca – Centre for Interactive research on Sustainability (CIRS)



From: Chan, Kai
Sent: Sunday, January 11, 2015 3:43 PM
To: RobinsonJohn
Subject: Re: papers; and sustainability, science, and the imaginary

Hi John,

Yes, we were talking past each other, and I think now I see how I might clarify my position so that we are more in line.

I completely agree with the Dark Ages; my point there was that many people who see themselves religious also agree that the material values mean that the Dark Ages were indeed dark. And the purpose of making that point was that people do not actually choose one of the three lenses, but multiple; the worlds that you would be forcing a choice between are not mutually exclusive. By forcing a false choice between the three, you may be sowing more confusion than enlightenment.

Re: the role of science in society, I agree with you almost completely on what you’ve written. I completely agree (and teach from the position) that science is not value neutral. But we differ on whether that means that science is prescriptive in the way that religion is. I argue strongly that it isn’t. I agree fully that there are no facts that come untinged with values through science, which is not and could not be a neutral process. But the values of ‘science’ are neither a complete nor a 'particular' homogenous set as needed for science to be prescriptive.

What I mean by complete is that the values that are included in scientific results (conflated within) are not sufficient such that, combined with the results of a study, they make a complete moral argument. When an individual argues that ‘science says we should …’ they are in fact including implicit moral premises that can be distinguished from the science itself, where different premises would result in different conclusions. So, while I agree that there is no clear distinction between facts and values, I disagree that science itself is prescriptive.

The second point is that the values in ‘science’ are not a ‘particular’ (homogenous) set. There are some broadly shared values, certainly, but there are also many values included by individual researchers into their own studies that are often not broadly shared. Another reason why ‘science' is not prescriptive.

I know that science has been used to further political ends, and it may well be the case that many people in North America currently believe that such uses of science are part of science. But in my mind, that is not science, but a use of science. Science, although not value-free, is indeed a process that limits the influence of values and the vast majority of scientists strive very hard to ensure this. Sure, we have persistent and prevalent blind spots, but to suggest that science is parallel to religion in terms of value, meaning (in a metaphysical or spiritual sense), and prescription, strikes me as misleading and very dangerous. 

I hope this clarifies my position! I wonder if there’s something worth writing for a broader audience here….

Best,
Kai

Monday, February 23, 2015

Interdisciplinary Culture Clash, part 2: Is Science a Religion? Were the Dark Ages Dark?

A continuing conversation between Dr. John Robinson and Dr. Kai Chan

This is part 2, find part 1 here. Part 3. Part 4. Part 5. Part 6 (conclusion).

KC: Last post, I introduced a provocative conversation between Dr. John Robinson and myself (Kai Chan) in which the surprisingly heated exchange retaught me lessons I thought I already knew about interdisciplinarity and CP Snow's two cultures (science and the humanities). I thought I was so 'over' that divide, until this first substantial response of John's about different interpretations of science, sustainability, and the Dark Ages....


From: <Robinson>, John 
Date: Friday, January 9, 2015 at 5:20 PM
To: Kai Chan 

Cc: "RobinsonJohn

Subject: RE: papers; and sustainability, science, and the imaginary

Kai,

I completely agree with you about the collective nature of the problem. We are in the middle of an intense discussion in the project on exactly this issue. That is why the choices made in the ‘world-making machine’ are by groups of four participants acting collectively.

I understand your view about science, and that is exactly what I would expect the character in the science category of our project to believe. But someone in the religious camp would have quite a different view, and so would someone in the literary camp. Note that this is not a matter only of world-view, but of the world itself. We call the Dark Ages dark, and that is a perfectly good judgement from within our own frame of reference. But any devout Christian from that time would be more likely to use that term to describe our world. From my point of view it is precisely the confident assertion in both the religious and scientific frames, that they are describing the real reality that underlies and informs all other frameworks of understanding (i.e. God or objective reality), that leads me to lump them together in terms of their epistemological stance. The literary stance differs fundamentally on that axis (though there are other axes of course).

Lots to discuss. I look forward to hearing any views you have on Rorty’s paper.

All the best,
John

John Robinson 
Associate Provost, Sustainability | UBC Sustainability Initiative
Professor | Institute of Resources, Environment and Sustainability
Professor | Department of Geography
The University of British Columbia
2260 West Mall Vancouver, BC Canada V6T 1Z4
www.sustain.ubc.ca – UBC Sustainability Initiative (USI)
www.ires.ubc.ca – Institute for Resources, Environment and Sustainability (IRES)
www.cirs.ubc.ca – Centre for Interactive research on Sustainability (CIRS)


From: Chan, Kai
Sent: Friday, January 09, 2015 8:58 PM
To: RobinsonJohn
Subject: Re: papers; and sustainability, science, and the imaginary

Hi John,

Thanks for this. Great re: the collective problem.

On the point below, I agree with you that different people might differ in their interpretation of what’s better, but that’s not the point I’m trying to make. [Digression: I don’t think that it’s only scientists (or people who primarily use science to help guide their actions) who call the Dark Ages dark. Many people consider the Dark Ages dark not because of the lack of science but because of the prevalence of disease, starvation, war, etc.]

My point is that science is not only or even primarily a worldview. You were critiquing the regenerative design folks who you felt were using science as a worldview, including as a moral compass. But, as I argued in your office, that is decidedly a minority view within the scientific community (and one that philosophers have rejected through logical argument, which I support). The majority of scientists that I know and read use science to interpret process, not meaning. And they use it to design solutions to meet given objectives, not to decide on appropriate objectives.

In my mind, the meaning (in a spiritual sense) must come from outside science, as must our goals and objectives. Accordingly, there is no necessary choice between religion or literature and science. They are not mutually exclusive, because science is not primarily a worldview. Many embrace both religion and science, and use religion to guide their spirituality and science to guide their understanding of process and consequence.

Some people say that science is a religion (implying, among other things, that people use it to interpret meaning and decide on objectives), but I dispute that. Some folks might mistakenly use science that way, as I think you’re critiquing the regenerative design folks, but your exhibit risks suggesting that such meaning-making and objective-setting are the, or a main, purpose of science. In my view, such a suggestion would demonize and misrepresent science and scientists.

Have a great weekend,
Kai